Human resources of post-war Lithuania and their role in the rebuilding of Klaipeda by Kretinin, Gennady V.
www.ssoar.info
Human resources of post-war Lithuania and their
role in the rebuilding of Klaipeda
Kretinin, Gennady V.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Kretinin, G. V. (2014). Human resources of post-war Lithuania and their role in the rebuilding of Klaipeda. Baltic
Region, 2, 113-120. https://doi.org/10.5922/2079-8555-2013-2-9
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Free Digital Peer Publishing Licence
zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den DiPP-Lizenzen
finden Sie hier:
http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/service/dppl/
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a Free Digital Peer
Publishing Licence. For more Information see:
http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/service/dppl/
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-51342-9
G. Kretinin 
 113 
HUMAN RESOURCES  
 
 
 
This article focuses on the issues of post-
WWII economic restoration effort in the So-
viet Lithuania. German occupation of the re-
public caused significant damage to its indu-
stry and agriculture. Pre-war Lithuania was 
an agrarian state aspiring to embark on an 
industrial-agrarian path of development. Af-
ter the war, this aspiration did not only per-
sist, but was intensified. To reach this objec-
tive, however, Lithuania required qualified 
workforce. Before the war, hardly any atten-
tion was paid to the training of workers for 
industrial-scale production and construction. 
Then, a considerable decrease in population 
during the war aggravated the already subs-
tantial labour shortage. The attempts of the 
republic’s leadership to solve the problems of 
labour shortage through organised labour 
migration and labour mobilisation yielded no 
significant results. The appeals to the Centre 
with the request to send a substantial number 
of specialists and workers to Lithuania were 
heard, but a state ravaged by war did not ha-
ve sufficient human resources. One of the so-
lutions was the use of labour of German pri-
soners of war. A network of prisoner-of-war 
camps was established in Lithuania. In a mat-
ter of two to three years, PWs completed a 
significant amount of work aimed at the re-
building of important infrastructural objects. 
The case of Klaipeda is used to demonstrate 
the opportunities of the region and Centre in 
organising workforce in the Lithuanian SSR. 
The study uses the data obtained by mo-
dern historiography and documents kept in 
the Lithuanian State Central Archive. 
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The problem of providing the natio-
nal economy of Lithuania with workforce 
became more acute after the transition to 
the socialist methods of management in 
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the summer of 1940. The Union Centre decides on the overall development 
of the national economy, and the backward agrarian country, as a result, was 
to become a strong industrial republic. 
The rich sources of raw materials became available to Lithuania, fears of 
overproduction of products disappeared, prospects of unlimited growth 
opened before the industry and agriculture of the Republic. For the first time 
in the interwar period, Lithuanian industry could develop at full capacity, 
factories and plants began to work in two or three shifts. As a result, existing 
equipment started working at full capacity. In 1940—1941, construction of 
large industrial enterprises (cement, machine-tool, sugar refineries, powerful 
brickyards, etc.) was launched; the construction of the Tournish hydropower 
station was begun, about 50 million roubles were assigned to electrification 
and municipal economy. A significant number of citizens were involved in 
the industry. 
It was Russia’s second attempt to move Lithuania to industrial rails. The 
first one related to the pre-revolutionary period, when large industrial 
enterprises were appearing in Lithuania. As a result, in 1913 in the Kovno 
province 9 large metal working plants with 3,300 workers were functioning. 
In the interwar period the concept of ‘big business’ changed: in 1926 in 
Lithuania there were 10 enterprises of the mentioned industry which were 
considered to be large but each of all told employed less than 700 workers. 
The similar situation could be observed in other areas of industry. For 
example, in 1913 the number of workers in the leather industry was 2,500, 
and in 1939—1,600 people [1, p. 7]. 
The Lithuanian experts of that time noted: ‘...about 6 % of the population 
are employed in the industry, while in prewar Russia already 17 % of the 
population was occupied in the industry’ (quoted: [2, p. 216]). 
In particular, in the first quarter of 1941 the number of workers in the 
industry increased to 80,000 people, but according to the plan for 1941, this 
growth was going to be even more significant: up to 137,000 people, which 
five times exceeded the number of workers employed in the industry of pre-
war Lithuania [3, l. 123]. 
The plans were reasonable enough. By the second half of October, 1940 
the labour reserve fund of the republic amounted to 109,000 people. This 
number included 37,000 unemployed recorded at the labour exchange, 
27,000 employed in public work of seasonal nature, 5,000 people deprived 
of former source of income in connection with the nationalization of 
industrial and commercial enterprises, 20,000 refugees from the Polish 
territory, 8,000 employed for a temporary construction of the railway, land 
and waterways, 2,000 people in logging and 10,000 people in urban and 
other types of construction. At that, 60 % of the total number of the fund 
were residents of Vilnius and the Vilnius region [4, l. 97]. 
It should be noted that the industrial enterprises (branches) and the whole 
economy needed workers of certain professions and qualifications. 
Lithuanian experts reported that 80 % of the entire mass of the unemployed 
were unskilled unemployed (labourers) (see, e. g. [5, p. 8]). 
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In the Republic of Lithuania preparation of skilled labour was not carried 
out, the personnel resources of Lithuania were scarce. In March 1945, the 
total number of blue collars and white collars were 175,831 people, of which 
about 60,000 were employed in industry and construction [6, l. 11]. The 
situation changed very little after the war. In the autumn of 1945, the total 
number of blue collars and white collars was 176,229 people, but in industry 
and construction reduced to 50,000 (see ibid, October 1945 [l. 30]). 
It is noteworthy that all people’s commissariats and departments of the 
Lithuanian SSR had to restore and reconstruct the factories, plants, ports, 
other enterprises, that is, to run primarily construction work. Therefore, in 
1945—1946 building trades were extremely scarce. Meanwhile, Republican 
Statistical Office reported that from February to October 1945 the number of 
workers of the construction and assembly professions in Lithuania was 5,000 
to 11,500 people. Experts from the Union republics began to arrive in the 
summer of 1945, and much more actively in the autumn and winter the same 
year. 
In April 1945, the republic's government attempted to streamline the 
flow of workers by sending them in the first place to the most important 
objects of reconstruction. With that end in view, on 26 April 1945 in 
Lithuania labour mobilisation was declared according to which cities and 
counties had to send workers to certain departments and organisations under 
the order of the Soviet Council of the Lithuanian SSR. In all, it was expected 
to mobilise 11,900 people (for managing railways — 5,500 people, for 
managing construction and building materials industry — 2,950 people, for 
the department of the municipal economy — 1,700 people, for local and 
light industry — 400 people for each, and so on). However, mobilisation 
went wrong. Only about 1,500 people were mobilised. At the same time, as 
it turned out, only one-third of them were skilled workers. The workers’ 
living conditions, conditions of work and catering were such that the 
mobilised soon simply ‘ran away home’ [7, l. 31, 33]. 
In fact, the situation with regard to the Klaipeda region, newly acquired 
by Lithuania, was becoming insoluble. After the war, it was completely 
without people: at the end of the war the local residents managed to emigrate 
west. Lithuania's government had to solve the problem of transmigration in 
the time of the overall population deficit; besides, we must note that during 
the Second World War, the population of the republic declined by more than 
significant. The documents report that in 1940 the total number of residents 
of Lithuania was 2 million 879,000 people [8, p. 54], but at the beginning of 
1946 in the Lithuanian SSR the total number of residents was 2 million 
296,000 people [9, l. 148]. 
A certain way out of the situation was to use labour of prisoners of war 
at restoration work — there were 35,000 of them on the territory of Lithu-
ania [10, l. 30]. The following solution was made: to build a POW camp for 
6,000 people in Klaipeda including 1,500 prisoners of war for work at the 
seaport. 
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However, Klaipeda did not get such a large number of prisoners of war. 
The documents report that the number of them in some periods reached 
4,500 people. In May 1946 in the Klaipeda camp there were 4,100 prisoners 
of war [11, l. 59]. 
Both the German prisoners of war and the soldiers of the Red Army 
serving in Klaipeda, played a significant role in the restoration of the city. 
Thus, while the sea trading port was being organised, it was planned that its 
staff would consist of about 3,000 workers and office workers. However, 
according to the accountable number the staff in 1945 was just 778 people. 
But the port capacity was not adjusted to the number of workers. But at the 
same time it was also necessary to carry out cleaning of the port and its har-
bour from marks of the war. In September 1945, in the 16th Lithuanian in-
fantry division there was created a working battalion of 1,000 people and 
sent to work in the port. Then 950 prisoners of war were sent there too. 
The employment of the latest had also the second side of the coin. There 
was some assistance to the national economy of the city, but the actual 
performance of a prisoner of war was only 67 % of the target. Naturally, that 
could not affect the turnover of the port which was able to fulfil the planned 
tasks only for 40 %. In addition, there was not enough skilled work force as 
well as specialists of engineering and technical staff [12, l. 18—20]. 
It should be noted that the employment of prisoners of war was 
favourable for the city: it was not bearing any costs for their alimentation. 
Security, transfer, catering, health care and public service — all this was 
assigned to the NKVD of the USSR. 
To restore the city's infrastructure, to build new industrial enterprises, 
just to develop Klaipeda labour resources from outside were needed, namely 
from the outside republic sources. It became clear that nobody except the 
Union republics could help Klaipeda, especially in specific sectors of the 
economy, such as the marine industry. 
It is natural to assume that there were many migrants from other regions 
of the USSR to Klaipeda. But there was no mass migration similar to that to 
the Kaliningrad region. Only specialists (of course, with families) from the 
soviet republics came to the Klaipeda region. Is it possible to speak about 
their quantitative structure? 
Even if we admit that the influx of specialists to Klaipeda could be about 
5,000 people per year (similar to Titlist, where during the first year after the 
war 3,000 to 5,000 migrants came from different regions), Russians, Byelo-
russians and other nationalities could not become the overwhelming majority 
of the population of the city. By 1 June 1946 in Klaipeda, there had been 
20,440 residents, in November of the same year there were 26 314, but in 
December — 29,090 people [13, l. 129; 14, l.105]. 
It is noteworthy that in their correspondence with the departments of the 
Union Centre, local authorities, agencies and organisations sent a request for 
specialists, graduates of vocational schools, young workers recruited by 
Komsomol and others to almost all the Union Commissariats. 
For instance, the General Department of Labour Reserves in the Council 
of People’s Commissars were ‘within August-September to send 1,000 skil-
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led workers (600 builders, 300 metalworkers and woodworkers 100) to the 
disposal of the Council of People's Commissars of the Lithuanian SSR from 
among the graduates of vocational schools, including for the Klaipeda seaport: 
metalworkers of various specialities — 50 people, builders — 150 people’ 
[15, l. 74—81]. 
In turn, the People’s Commissariat of Trade of the USSR was to ‘provide 
loaders, machine operators, operatives and warehouse workers, workers of 
industrial and construction workers, also port engineers and technicians in 
Klaipeda with food products according to the norms … for the employees of 
enterprises according to the special list; allocate additional main dish for 
these groups of workers increasing limits for the People’s Commissariat of 
Fleet for 1,500 people; allocate limit dinners of B type for executives of the 
Klaipeda port up to 25 people, packed lunches for 25 people according to the 
norms of the special list, dinners at special dining cards for 75 people’ [15,  
l. 80]. 
Naturally, the newcoming experts were provided with accommodation 
on favourable terms. All this displeased the Lithuanian population not 
employed in enterprises like the seaport because of the lack of necessary 
skills. 
The vital task facing the new region of Lithuania in the first months of 
the Soviet rule, as the leadership understood it, — was preparion work for 
spring agricultural season. It was supposed that in the spring of 1945 in the 
Klaipėda region there would be organised 30 state farms having three 
branches each. The People's Commissariat of Agriculture was given two 
weeks to develop plans for a network of state farms, machine and tractor 
stations, research stations and other institutions. By February 15 the regional 
administrative unit was to be staffed with agricultural specialists: 30 state 
farms directors, 30 chief accountants, 30 agronomists; 90 managers of de-
partments had to come to new places of work. The People's Commissariat of 
Agriculture had another month for selecting and sending 3,000 peasant fa-
milies to the counties of Klaipėda who had to become the basis of the new 
network of agricultural enterprises in rural areas. About 20 hectares of land 
was planned to allocate to each family. In addition, the new settlers were 
charged with the task of carrying out supervision of neighbouring neglected 
areas [15, l. 36—37]. 
However, the campaign of 1945 to integrate the Klaipeda regional lands 
into agricultural use from the very beginning failed. Lithuanian peasants did 
not thrive for the resettlement. People's Commissars of the USSR, worried 
about the slow peopling of Klaipeda and its surroundings, on 12 June 1945 
ordered the Lithuanian authorities to resettle there 9600 peasant families 
from other counties of Lithuania within June-July [16, l. 284]. The Moscow 
decree of June 20 was duplicated with the decree of the People’s Commis-
sariat of the Lithuanian SSR and the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party (Bolsheviks) of Lithuania [17, l. 179]. It seemed that original re-
settlement of 3,000 peasant families planned by the party leadership of the 
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republic was even overfulfilled. By 20 July 3584 families moved to the re-
gion. However, such amount of the population, even with the 2,436 local fa-
milies, residents not evacuated by Germans, did not solve the general prob-
lem of restoration of the agricultural economy. 
At the end of the autumn of 1945 the People’s Commissariat of the 
Lithuanian SSR was forced to state that the executive committees of the 
republic fulfil the Resolution of the People's Commissariat and the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Lithuania of 20 June 
unsatisfactorily [18, l. 179—180]. 
The resolution noted that on 1 November 1945 the plan of moving 
peasants and farm workers was carried out only by 64.2 % (from 9,600 
families or households resettled all 5,399). Especially behind of the schedule 
were the following counties: the Ukmerge County, in which the percentage 
was 10.8 %, Alytus — 13.7 %, Utena — 14.5 %, Lazdiyay — 20 %. It was 
said about it without giving reasons: either negligence or intention it was, or 
bad work of local executive bodies. In particular, in addition to farmers also 
teachers, agricultural specialists, medical experts and others were supposed 
to go to a new place of residence in the Klaipeda region according to the 
order of People's Commissars of the Lithuanian SSR. But this did not take 
place. Allocation of one-time dowries to resettled peasants and workers of 
state farms was delayed (by 1 November 1945 only 1,223 households of the 
5,399 moved farms received cash loans). Sale of heifers to migrants who did 
not have cattle in their former places of residence, did not take place (but it 
was the most significant item in the list of benefits in the post-war hungry 
time) [18]. 
 
The mentioned above and other drawbacks of the resettlement policy (to 
say nothing of the fact that it was launched late) led to an actual disruption of 
the agricultural year in the Klaipeda region. It turned out that Lithuania 
could not solve its agricultural problem with simple moving peasants there. 
At least in short time. Assistance from the Centre was needed. 
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